Chan David K
Bioethics. 2015 May;29(4):274-82. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12102. Epub 2014 Jun 9.
Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature - one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent.
尽管有人批评尊严是一个模糊且难以捉摸的概念，但一些国际生物伦理准则已就违背人类尊严的研究发出警告，特别提及了基因技术。基因研究与人类尊严之间有何联系？在本文中，我探究了人类尊严在其各种历史形式中的概念，并审视了它作为一种道德概念的地位。与康德关于人类尊严的理想概念不同，经验性或关联性概念将人类尊严视为受一个人的境遇以及他人行为影响的东西。我认为，对某些形式的基因研究的尊严异议基于一种人性观，这种人性观赋予人类在自然界中的特殊地位——而基因研究有可能将个体简化为其基因禀赋，从而威胁到这一地位。我区分了两种主要的人性哲学观点。其中一种是亚里士多德式观点，它与利用基因技术帮助人类更充分地实现其内在潜力是相容的。
