Brañas-Garza Pablo, Espín Antonio M, Exadaktylos Filippos, Herrmann Benedikt
Business School, Middlesex University London, London NW4 4BT, UK.
GLOBE, Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja s/n, 18071 Granada, Spain.
Sci Rep. 2014 Aug 12;4:6025. doi: 10.1038/srep06025.
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
在最后通牒博弈中,提议者提出如何与响应者分配一笔钱。如果响应者拒绝该提议,双方都得不到任何东西。拒绝不公平的提议被视为一种由秉持公平的个体实施的惩罚形式,这些个体愿意以个人代价推行合作规范。然而,最近使用其他实验框架的研究发现,有竞争力、心怀恶意的个体存在不可忽视程度的反社会惩罚行为,这最终可能破坏合作。通过两项大规模实验,本论文通过分析最后通牒博弈惩罚者在独裁者博弈中的行为,探究了他们的本质。在两项研究中,均证实了两个截然不同的亚群体的共存:一方面是亲社会惩罚者,他们作为独裁者时行为公平;另一方面是心怀恶意(反社会)的惩罚者,他们完全不公平。这一发现对于合作的演变以及稳定社会系统的行为基础具有重要意义。