Barasch Alixandra, Levine Emma E, Berman Jonathan Z, Small Deborah A
The Wharton School.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2014 Sep;107(3):393-413. doi: 10.1037/a0037207.
Theories that reject the existence of altruism presume that emotional benefits serve as ulterior motives for doing good deeds. These theories argue that even in the absence of material and reputational benefits, individuals reap utility from the feelings associated with doing good. In response to this normative view of altruism, this article examines the descriptive question of whether laypeople penalize emotional prosocial actors. Six studies find that emotion serves as a positive signal of moral character, despite the intrapsychic benefits associated with it. This is true when emotion motivates prosocial behavior (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5) and when emotion is a positive outcome of prosocial behavior (i.e., "warm glow"; Studies 4, 5, and 6). Emotional actors are considered to be moral because people believe emotion provides an honest and direct signal that the actor feels a genuine concern for others. Consequently, prosocial actors who are motivated by the expectation of emotional rewards are judged differently than prosocial actors who are motivated by other benefits, such as reputational or material rewards (Study 6). These results suggest that laypeople do not view altruism as incompatible with all benefits to the self.
那些否认利他主义存在的理论假定,情感上的益处是做好事的潜在动机。这些理论认为,即便没有物质和声誉方面的益处,个人也能从做好事所带来的情感中获得效用。针对这种关于利他主义的规范性观点,本文探讨一个描述性问题,即外行人是否会惩罚出于情感而行善的人。六项研究发现,尽管情感有益己的一面,但它仍是道德品质的积极信号。当情感激发亲社会行为时(研究1、2、3和5)以及当情感是亲社会行为的积极结果时(即“温暖效应”;研究4、5和6),情况都是如此。情感型行为者被认为是有道德的,因为人们相信情感能提供一个诚实且直接的信号,表明行为者真正关心他人。因此,因期望获得情感回报而产生动机的亲社会行为者,与因声誉或物质回报等其他益处而产生动机的亲社会行为者,受到的评判有所不同(研究6)。这些结果表明,外行人并不认为利他主义与自身的所有益处都不相容。