Hilbig Benjamin E, Richter Tobias
University of Mannheim and Max-Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsDepartment of Psychology, University of Kassel.
Top Cogn Sci. 2011 Jan;3(1):187-96. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01123.x.
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) have argued for a "Homo heuristicus" view of judgment and decision making, claiming that there is evidence for a majority of individuals using fast and frugal heuristics. In this vein, they criticize previous studies that tested the descriptive adequacy of some of these heuristics. In addition, they provide a reanalysis of experimental data on the recognition heuristic that allegedly supports Gigerenzer and Brighton's view of pervasive reliance on heuristics. However, their arguments and reanalyses are both conceptually and methodologically problematic. We provide counterarguments and a reanalysis of the data considered by Gigerenzer and Brighton. Results clearly replicate previous findings, which are at odds with the claim that simple heuristics provide a general description of inferences for a majority of decision makers.
吉仁泽和布莱顿（2009年）主张一种关于判断和决策的“启发式人”观点，声称有证据表明大多数人使用快速节俭启发式。本着这种精神，他们批评了之前测试其中一些启发式描述充分性的研究。此外，他们对识别启发式的实验数据进行了重新分析，据称这支持了吉仁泽和布莱顿关于普遍依赖启发式的观点。然而，他们的论点和重新分析在概念和方法上都存在问题。我们提出了反驳论点，并对吉仁泽和布莱顿所考虑的数据进行了重新分析。结果清楚地重现了之前的发现，这与简单启发式能为大多数决策者的推理提供一般性描述的说法不一致。
