Department of Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Prague, Czech Republic.
Front Psychol. 2014 Sep 30;5:1081. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01081. eCollection 2014.
The question of visibility and invisibility in social understanding is examined here. First, the phenomenological account of expressive phenomena and key ideas of the participatory sense-making theory are presented with regard to the issue of visibility. These accounts plead for the principal visibility of agents in interaction. Although participatory sense-making does not completely rule out the existence of opacity and invisible aspects of agents in interaction, it assumes the capacity of agents to integrate disruptions, opacity and misunderstandings in mutual modulation. Invisibility is classified as the dialectical counterpart of visibility, i.e., as a lack of sense whereby the dynamics of perpetual asking, of coping with each other and of improvements in interpretation are brought into play. By means of empirical exemplification this article aims at demonstrating aspects of invisibility in social interaction which complement the enactive interpretation. Without falling back into Cartesianism, it shows through dramaturgical analysis of a practice called "(Inter)acting with the inner partner" that social interaction includes elements of opacity and invisibility whose role is performative. This means that opacity is neither an obstacle to be overcome with more precise understanding nor a lack of meaning, but rather an excess of sense, a "hiddenness" of something real that has an "active power" (Merleau-Ponty). In this way it contributes to on-going social understanding as a hidden potentiality that naturally enriches, amplifies and in part constitutes human participation in social interactions. It is also shown here that this invisible excess of sense already functions on the level of self-relationship due to the essential self-opacity and self-alterity of each agent of social interaction. The analysis consequently raises two issues: the question of the enactive ethical stance toward the alterity of the other and the question of the autonomy of the self-opaque agent.
这里探讨了社会理解中的可见性和不可见性问题。首先,本文呈现了关于可见性问题的表达现象的现象学描述和参与式意义建构理论的关键思想。这些描述支持了互动中主体的主要可见性。尽管参与式意义建构并没有完全排除互动中主体的不透明性和不可见性的存在,但它假设了主体在相互调节中整合中断、不透明性和误解的能力。不可见性被归类为可见性的辩证对应物,即缺乏意义,从而使永恒提问、相互应对和解释改进的动态发挥作用。通过实证例证,本文旨在展示社会互动中不可见性的方面,这些方面补充了生成论的解释。本文没有陷入笛卡尔主义,而是通过对一种名为“(内)与内在伙伴互动”的实践的戏剧性分析表明,社会互动包括不透明性和不可见性的元素,其作用是表现性的。这意味着不透明性既不是需要用更精确的理解来克服的障碍,也不是缺乏意义,而是一种过度的意义,是某种真实事物的“隐藏性”,它具有“积极的力量”(梅洛-庞蒂)。通过这种方式,它作为一种隐藏的潜力,为正在进行的社会理解做出贡献,这种潜力自然地丰富、放大并在某种程度上构成了人类对社会互动的参与。此外,这里还表明,由于每个社会互动主体的本质上的不透明性和自我变异性,这种不可见的过度意义已经在自我关系的层面上发挥作用。因此,分析提出了两个问题:关于对他者的能动性伦理立场的问题,以及关于自我不透明主体的自主性的问题。