Harvard University, United States.
Duke Law J. 2014 Oct;64(1):1-52.
Choice can be an extraordinary benefit or an immense burden. In some contexts, people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. In part because of limitations of "bandwidth," and in part because of awareness of their own lack of information and potential biases, people sometimes want other people to choose for them. For example, many people prefer not to make choices about their health or retirement plans; they want to delegate those choices to a private or public institution that they trust (and may well be willing to pay a considerable amount to those who are willing to accept such delegations). This point suggests that however well accepted, the line between active choosing and paternalism is often illusory. When private or public institutions override people's desire not to choose and insist on active choosing, they may well be behaving paternalistically, through a form of choice-requiring paternalism. Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism, and a frequently attractive one, if people are permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense permitted not to choose); it is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are required to choose. For both ordinary people and private or public institutions, the ultimate judgment in favor of active choosing, or in favor of choosing not to choose, depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors.
选择可以是一种非凡的好处,也可以是一种巨大的负担。在某些情况下,人们选择不做选择,或者如果被要求的话,他们会选择不做选择。部分是因为“带宽”的限制,部分是因为意识到自己信息不足和潜在偏见,人们有时希望别人替他们做选择。例如,许多人不喜欢对自己的健康或退休计划做出选择;他们希望将这些选择委托给他们信任的私人或公共机构(并且很可能愿意向那些愿意接受此类委托的人支付相当数量的费用)。这一点表明,无论多么被接受,积极选择和家长主义之间的界限往往是虚幻的。当私人或公共机构超越人们不做选择的愿望并坚持积极选择时,他们可能通过一种要求选择的家长主义形式表现出家长主义。如果人们被允许选择退出选择,转而选择默认(在这个意义上被允许不选择),那么积极选择可以被视为一种自由意志家长主义,而且是一种经常具有吸引力的选择;只要人们被要求选择,它就是一种非自由意志家长主义。对于普通人和私人或公共机构来说,赞成积极选择或赞成不选择的最终判断,在很大程度上取决于决策的成本和错误的成本。