Deng Xinyang, Liu Qi, Sadiq Rehan, Deng Yong
School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China.
1] Center for Quantitative Sciences, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37232, USA [2] Department of Biomedical Informatics, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37232, USA.
Sci Rep. 2014 Nov 7;4:6937. doi: 10.1038/srep06937.
The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.
合作的进化是进化博弈论领域一个热门且具有挑战性的话题。利他行为作为合作的一种特殊形式,已通过最后通牒博弈得到广泛研究,但独裁者博弈却未对其进行研究,而独裁者博弈提供了一种更巧妙的方式来识别行为的利他成分。在本文中,进化独裁者博弈被用于模拟利他主义的真实动机。利用一种基于度的机制来评估角色分配对具有两种策略更新机制的异质结构群体中进化结果的影响,这两种机制分别基于达尔文的进化论和间断平衡理论。结果表明,进化结果受角色分配的影响,并且这种影响还取决于策略更新机制、用于评估玩家成功与否的函数以及群体结构。