Herschbach Mitchell
Department of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge, United States.
Conscious Cogn. 2015 Nov;36:483-97. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.001. Epub 2015 Apr 29.
The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic "Type 1" form of mindreading and a slow, effortful "Type 2" form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts' Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill's dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP's phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.
直接社会感知（DSP）论题宣称，我们能够直接感知他人的某些心理状态。心理状态的直接感知已从现象学和心理学角度进行了阐述，并且通常局限于意图和情感等心理状态类型。我将把DSP与另一种读心术解释进行比较：双过程解释，它假定存在一种快速、自动的“1型”读心术形式和一种缓慢、费力的“2型”读心术形式。我将在此分析双过程解释中的1型读心术是否是DSP的竞争对手，或者某些1型读心术是否可以是感知性的。我将聚焦于阿珀利和巴特菲尔对诸如感知、知识和信念等认知状态的双过程读心术解释。这种解释假定了一种对类似信念状态的最小形式的1型读心术，称为登记。我将论证，一般的双过程理论与被视为一种1型过程的感知模块化观点非常契合。我将表明，这种感知模块化观点对DSP的现象学和心理学论题构成了挑战，并且具有显著优势。最后，我将论证，如果接受这样一种感知模块化观点，就有充分理由认为对类似信念状态的1型读心术本质上是感知性的。这将意味着把DSP的范围至少扩展到一种认知状态类型。
