Gallagher Shaun
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA; Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Australia.
Conscious Cogn. 2015 Nov;36:452-65. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.002. Epub 2015 May 4.
I evaluate several attempts to integrate standard theories of social cognition, either theory theory or simulation theory, with aspects of interaction theory, and especially with the concept of direct social perception. I refer to these as new hybrid theories of social cognition. One of the new hybrids accomplishes the integration only by weakening the concept of mindreading or by understanding mindreading as targeting the shared situation rather than the other's mental states. Hybrids that attempt to accommodate the idea of direct perception of mental states grant a phenomenological directness only by maintaining tacit (theory-based) inferences on the subpersonal level. If such inferential processes are thought to be extra-perceptual, then perception is neither sufficient nor direct for an understanding of intentions and emotions. Moreover, insistence on top-down inferential processes trades off against the possibility of plasticity in the perceptual system itself. I suggest that a better model than a hybrid theory would be a pluralist one. A pluralist approach to social cognition would treat theoretical inference, simulation, direct perception, interactive skills, etc. as different strategies. The real challenge is to work out a pluralist account of subpersonal processes.
我评估了几种将社会认知的标准理论（无论是理论论还是模拟论）与互动理论的各个方面，特别是与直接社会感知概念相结合的尝试。我将这些称为社会认知的新混合理论。其中一种新的混合理论仅通过弱化读心概念或将读心理解为针对共享情境而非他人的心理状态来实现整合。试图容纳心理状态直接感知观点的混合理论，仅通过在次人格层面维持隐含的（基于理论的）推理来赋予现象学上的直接性。如果这种推理过程被认为是超感知的，那么对于意图和情感的理解而言，感知既不充分也不直接。此外，坚持自上而下的推理过程不利于感知系统本身的可塑性。我认为，比混合理论更好的模型是多元主义模型。社会认知的多元主义方法会将理论推理、模拟、直接感知、互动技能等视为不同的策略。真正的挑战是制定出一种关于次人格过程的多元主义解释。
