Lee Joung-Hun, Jusup Marko, Podobnik Boris, Iwasa Yoh
Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
Faculty of Civil Engineering, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia; Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia; Zagreb School of Economics and Management, Zagreb, Croatia.
PLoS One. 2015 May 6;10(5):e0126447. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0126447. eCollection 2015.
By drawing analogies with independent research areas, we propose an unorthodox framework for mapping microfinance credit risk--a major obstacle to the sustainability of lenders outreaching to the poor. Specifically, using the elements of network theory, we constructed an agent-based model that obeys the stylized rules of microfinance industry. We found that in a deteriorating economic environment confounded with adverse selection, a form of latent moral hazard may cause a regime shift from a high to a low loan payment probability. An after-the-fact recovery, when possible, required the economic environment to improve beyond that which led to the shift in the first place. These findings suggest a small set of measurable quantities for mapping microfinance credit risk and, consequently, for balancing the requirements to reasonably price loans and to operate on a fully self-financed basis. We illustrate how the proposed mapping works using a 10-year monthly data set from one of the best-known microfinance representatives, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Finally, we discuss an entirely new perspective for managing microfinance credit risk based on enticing spontaneous cooperation by building social capital.
通过与独立研究领域进行类比，我们提出了一个非传统的框架来映射小额信贷风险——这是贷款机构服务穷人可持续性的一个主要障碍。具体而言，利用网络理论的要素，我们构建了一个基于主体的模型，该模型遵循小额信贷行业的典型规则。我们发现，在经济环境恶化且存在逆向选择的情况下，一种潜在的道德风险形式可能导致贷款偿还概率从高到低的 regime shift。事后回收（如果可能的话）要求经济环境改善到超过最初导致这种转变的程度。这些发现表明了一组用于映射小额信贷风险的可测量量，因此，用于平衡合理定价贷款和完全自筹资金运营的要求。我们使用来自孟加拉国最著名的小额信贷代表之一格莱珉银行的10年月度数据集来说明所提出的映射是如何工作的。最后，我们讨论了基于通过建立社会资本来吸引自发合作来管理小额信贷风险的全新视角。
