Gable Philip A, Poole Bryan D, Harmon-Jones Eddie
Department of Psychology, The University of Alabama.
Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Lee University.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2015 Jul;109(1):163-74. doi: 10.1037/a0039226. Epub 2015 May 25.
For the last 50 years, research investigating the effect of emotions on scope of cognitive processing was based on models proposing that affective valence determined cognitive scope. More recently, our motivational intensity model suggests that this past work had confounded valence with motivational intensity. Research derived from this model supports the idea that motivational intensity, rather than affective valence, explains much of the variance emotions have on cognitive scope. However, the motivational intensity model is limited in that the empirical work has examined only positive affects high in approach and negative affects high in avoidance motivation. Thus, perhaps only approach-positive and avoidance-negative states narrow cognitive scope. The present research was designed to clarify these conceptual issues by examining the effect of anger, a negatively valenced approach-motivated state, on cognitive scope. Results revealed that anger narrowed attentional scope relative to a neutral state and that attentional narrowing to anger was similar to the attentional narrowing caused by high approach-motivated positive affects (Study 1). This narrowing of attention was related to trait approach motivation (Studies 2 and Study 3). Anger also narrowed conceptual cognitive categorization (Study 4). Narrowing of categorization related to participants' approach motivation toward anger stimuli. Together, these results suggest that anger, an approach-motivated negative affect, narrows perceptual and conceptual cognitive scope. More broadly, these results support the conceptual model that motivational intensity per se, rather than approach-positive and avoidance-negative states, causes a narrowing of cognitive scope.
在过去的50年里,关于情绪对认知加工范围影响的研究是基于一些模型展开的,这些模型提出情感效价决定认知范围。最近,我们的动机强度模型表明,过去的这项工作将效价与动机强度混淆了。基于该模型的研究支持了这样一种观点,即解释情绪对认知范围产生的大部分差异的是动机强度,而非情感效价。然而,动机强度模型存在局限性,因为实证研究仅考察了具有高趋近性的积极情绪和具有高回避动机的消极情绪。因此,也许只有趋近性积极和回避性消极状态会缩小认知范围。本研究旨在通过考察愤怒(一种具有负性效价的趋近动机状态)对认知范围的影响来厘清这些概念问题。结果显示,与中性状态相比,愤怒会缩小注意范围,且对愤怒的注意缩小与由高趋近动机的积极情绪所导致的注意缩小相似(研究1)。这种注意的缩小与特质趋近动机有关(研究2和研究3)。愤怒还会缩小概念性认知分类(研究4)。分类的缩小与参与者对愤怒刺激的趋近动机有关。总之,这些结果表明,愤怒这种具有趋近动机的消极情绪会缩小感知和概念性认知范围。更广泛地说,这些结果支持了这样一种概念模型,即动机强度本身而非趋近性积极和回避性消极状态会导致认知范围的缩小。