Bateman Ian J, Coombes Emma, Fitzherbert Emily, Binner Amy, Bad'ura Tomáš, Carbone Chris, Fisher Brendan, Naidoo Robin, Watkinson Andrew R
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom;
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom; Department of Zoology, Zoological Society of London, Regent's Park, London NW1 4RY, United Kingdom;
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015 Jun 16;112(24):7408-13. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1406484112.
The recent report from the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity [(2010) Global Biodiversity Outlook 3] acknowledges that ongoing biodiversity loss necessitates swift, radical action. Protecting undisturbed lands, although vital, is clearly insufficient, and the key role of unprotected, private land owned is being increasingly recognized. Seeking to avoid common assumptions of a social planner backed by government interventions, the present work focuses on the incentives of the individual landowner. We use detailed data to show that successful conservation on private land depends on three factors: conservation effectiveness (impact on target species), private costs (especially reductions in production), and private benefits (the extent to which conservation activities provide compensation, for example, by enhancing the value of remaining production). By examining the high-profile issue of palm-oil production in a major tropical biodiversity hotspot, we show that the levels of both conservation effectiveness and private costs are inherently spatial; varying the location of conservation activities can radically change both their effectiveness and private cost implications. We also use an economic choice experiment to show that consumers' willingness to pay for conservation-grade palm-oil products has the potential to incentivize private producers sufficiently to engage in conservation activities, supporting vulnerable International Union for Conservation of Nature Red Listed species. However, these incentives vary according to the scale and efficiency of production and the extent to which conservation is targeted to optimize its cost-effectiveness. Our integrated, interdisciplinary approach shows how strategies to harness the power of the market can usefully complement existing--and to-date insufficient--approaches to conservation.
《生物多样性公约》秘书处近期的报告[(2010年)《全球生物多样性展望3》]承认,当前生物多样性的丧失需要迅速采取彻底行动。保护未受干扰的土地虽然至关重要,但显然还不够,未受保护的私有土地所起的关键作用正日益得到认可。为避免社会规划者在政府干预支持下的常见假设,本研究聚焦于个体土地所有者的激励因素。我们使用详细数据表明,私有土地上的成功保护取决于三个因素:保护成效(对目标物种的影响)、私人成本(尤其是产量的减少)以及私人收益(保护活动提供补偿的程度,例如通过提高剩余产量的价值)。通过研究一个主要热带生物多样性热点地区备受瞩目的棕榈油生产问题,我们表明保护成效和私人成本在本质上都是空间性的;改变保护活动的地点会从根本上改变其成效和私人成本影响。我们还通过一项经济选择实验表明,消费者为符合保护标准的棕榈油产品支付的意愿有潜力充分激励私人生产者参与保护活动,以支持脆弱的国际自然保护联盟红色名录物种。然而,这些激励因素会因生产规模和效率以及保护活动为优化成本效益而进行针对性调整的程度而有所不同。我们综合的跨学科方法展示了如何利用市场力量的策略能够有效补充现有的——且至今仍不充分的——保护方法。