Wilson D S, Kniffin K M
Department of Biological Sciences, SUNY-Binghamton, 13902-6000, Binghamton, NY.
Hum Nat. 1999 Sep;10(3):291-310. doi: 10.1007/s12110-999-1005-x.
Many evolutionary models assume that behaviors are caused directly by genes. An implication is that behavioral uniformity should be found only in groups that are genetically uniform. Yet, the members of human social groups often behave in a uniform fashion, despite the fact that they are genetically diverse. Behavioral uniformity can occur through a variety of psychological mechanisms and social processes, such as imitation, consensus decision making, or the imposition of social norms. We present a series of models in which genes code for social transmission rules, which in turn govern the behaviors that are adopted. Transmission rules can evolve in randomly formed groups that concentrate phenotypic variation at the between-group level, favoring the evolution of altruistic behaviors and other group-advantageous traits. In addition, a direct bias toward adopting altruistic behaviors can evolve. Our models begin to show how group selection can be a strong force in human evolution, despite the absence of extreme genetic variation among groups.
许多进化模型假定行为是由基因直接导致的。这意味着行为一致性应该只在基因同质的群体中出现。然而，人类社会群体的成员常常表现出一致的行为方式，尽管他们在基因上是多样的。行为一致性可以通过多种心理机制和社会过程产生，比如模仿、共识决策或社会规范的强制实施。我们提出了一系列模型，其中基因编码社会传播规则，而这些规则反过来又支配所采用的行为。传播规则可以在随机形成的群体中进化，这种群体将表型变异集中在群体间层面，有利于利他行为和其他对群体有利的特征的进化。此外，对采用利他行为的直接偏好也可以进化。我们的模型开始展示群体选择如何能成为人类进化中的一股强大力量，尽管群体之间不存在极端的基因变异。
