Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa.
Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia.
J Appl Psychol. 2016 Feb;101(2):171-89. doi: 10.1037/apl0000040. Epub 2015 Jul 27.
This research takes a moral perspective to studying third parties' reactions to injustice as a function of their moral identity. Drawing from theories of deontic justice, moral intuition, moral heuristics, and moral identity, we develop and test a model of the moral underpinnings of third parties' reactions to injustice. First, we compare third parties' responses with interpersonal, distributive, and procedural justice violations. We hypothesize that third parties are more likely to intuit that interpersonal justice violations are morally wrong, compared with distributive and procedural justice violations. As a result, third parties are more likely to experience stronger moral anger and punish violators in response to interpersonal transgressions compared with distributive and procedural justice transgressions. Second, we test the proposition that third parties with a strong moral identity will react more strongly to justice violations than third parties with a comparatively weak moral identity. Results from 3 studies support these predictions.
本研究从道德视角出发,探讨了第三方对不公正行为的反应,其反应取决于他们的道德认同。借鉴义务论正义、道德直觉、道德启发式和道德认同等理论,我们提出并检验了一个关于第三方对不公正行为反应的道德基础模型。首先,我们将第三方的反应与人际、分配和程序正义违规进行了比较。我们假设,与分配和程序正义违规相比,第三方更有可能直觉地认为人际正义违规在道德上是错误的。因此,与分配和程序正义违规相比,第三方更有可能因为人际侵犯而感到强烈的道德愤怒,并对侵犯者进行惩罚。其次,我们检验了这样一个假设,即具有强烈道德认同的第三方比具有相对较弱道德认同的第三方对正义违规的反应更强烈。三项研究的结果支持了这些预测。