Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6072 (
Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambrdige, MA 02142-1347 (
Am Econ Rev. 2013 Feb;103(1):178-219. doi: 10.1257/aer.103.1.178.
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.
我们利用单一公司的员工层面面板数据，探讨了个体可能会根据他们对保险的预期行为（“道德风险”）反应来选择保险的可能性，我们将这种现象称为“道德风险选择”。我们使用计划选择和医疗利用模型，提供了道德风险异质性以及对此进行选择的证据，并探讨了其一些影响。例如，我们表明，至少在我们的背景下，忽略道德风险选择可能会导致对引入高免赔额健康保险选择相关支出减少的高估。
