Laurie Graeme
Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, and Founding Director of the JK Mason Institute for Medicine, Life Sciences and the Law in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
J Law Med Ethics. 2014 Spring;42(1):53-63. doi: 10.1111/jlme.12118.
This article argues for the importance of conceptual clarity in the debate about the so-called right not to know. This is vital both at the theoretical and the practical level. It is suggested that, unlike many formulations and attempts to give effect to this right, what is at stake is not merely an aspect of personal autonomy and therefore cannot and should not be reduced only to a question of individual choice. Rather, it is argued that the core interests that can be protected by the right not to know are better conceived of as privacy interests rather than autonomy interests. This not only helps us to understand what is in play but also informs regulatory, professional, and legal responses to handling information and taking decisions about whether or not to disclose information to persons about themselves. The practical implications of this conceptualization are explored in the context of feedback policies in health-related research.
本文论证了在关于所谓“不知情权”的辩论中概念清晰的重要性。这在理论和实践层面都至关重要。有人认为,与许多对这项权利的表述及实施尝试不同,所涉及的不仅仅是个人自主性的一个方面,因此不能也不应仅仅归结为个人选择的问题。相反,有人认为,“不知情权”所能保护的核心利益更应被视为隐私利益而非自主利益。这不仅有助于我们理解其中的利害关系,还能为处理信息以及就是否向个人披露与其自身相关的信息做出决策时的监管、专业和法律应对提供依据。本文在健康相关研究的反馈政策背景下探讨了这种概念化的实际影响。