构建利维坦——惩罚权力的自愿集中维持人类的合作。
Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans.
作者信息
Gross Jörg, Méder Zsombor Z, Okamoto-Barth Sanae, Riedl Arno
机构信息
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Department of Economics (AE1), School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
出版信息
Sci Rep. 2016 Feb 18;6:20767. doi: 10.1038/srep20767.
The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.
人类合作的普遍性令人费解，因为合作者可能会被搭便车者利用。同伴惩罚被认为是解决这一难题的方法，但越来越多的证据对其在维持合作方面的稳健性提出了质疑。除其他因素外，当惩罚力度不够大或引发反惩罚时，惩罚就会失效。然而，现有研究忽略了惩罚权力的分配可能是社会互动的结果。我们引入了一个新颖的实验，在这个实验中，个体可以将惩罚权力转移给他人。我们发现，虽然分散的同伴惩罚无法克服搭便车行为，但惩罚权力的自愿转移使群体能够维持合作。这是通过不实施惩罚的合作者赋予那些愿意为群体利益进行惩罚的人权力来实现的。我们的结果表明了自愿的权力集中如何能够有效地维持合作，这可以解释为什么等级权力结构在动物和人类中广泛存在。
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