Hutto Daniel D
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong , Wollongong, NSW , Australia.
Front Psychiatry. 2016 Feb 16;7:12. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2016.00012. eCollection 2016.
Philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough choice between two competing ways of understanding mental disorders. The folk psychology (FP) view puts our everyday normative conceptual scheme in the driver's seat - on the assumption that it, and it only, tells us what mental disorders are (1). Opposing this, the scientific image (SI) view (2, 3) holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely, from the sciences of the mind, unfettered by FP. This paper argues that the FP view is problematic because it is too limited: there is more to the mind than FP allows; hence, we must look beyond FP for properly deep and illuminating explanations of mental disorders. SI promises just this. But when cast in its standard cognitivist formulations, SI is unnecessarily and unjustifiably neurocentric. After rejecting both the FP view, in its pure form, and SI view, in its popular cognitivist renderings, this paper concludes that a more liberal version of SI can accommodate what is best in both views - once SI is so formulated and the FP view properly edited and significantly revised, the two views can be reconciled and combined to provide a sound philosophical basis for a future psychiatry.
精神病学哲学在两种相互竞争的理解精神障碍的方式之间面临艰难抉择。民间心理学（FP）观点将我们日常的规范性概念框架置于主导地位——其假设是，唯有它能告诉我们精神障碍是什么（1）。与之相对，科学图景（SI）观点（2, 3）认为，我们对精神障碍的理解必须完全且仅仅来自心智科学，不受民间心理学的束缚。本文认为，民间心理学观点存在问题，因为它过于局限：心智所包含的内容比民间心理学所允许的更多；因此，我们必须超越民间心理学，以获得对精神障碍恰当深刻且具有启发性的解释。科学图景有望做到这一点。但当以其标准的认知主义表述呈现时，科学图景不必要且不合理地以神经为中心。在摒弃纯粹形式的民间心理学观点以及流行的认知主义表述的科学图景观点之后，本文得出结论，一个更宽泛版本的科学图景可以兼收两种观点的优点——一旦科学图景如此构建，且民间心理学观点经过恰当编辑和重大修订，这两种观点就能相互协调并结合起来，为未来的精神病学提供坚实的哲学基础。
