Fishman Michael A
J Theor Biol. 2016 Jun 7;398:130-5. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.03.012. Epub 2016 Mar 22.
In this paper, I present an analytical framework for polymorphic evolutionary games suitable for explicitly modeling evolutionary processes in diploid populations with sexual reproduction. The principal aspect of the proposed approach is adding diploid genetics cum sexual recombination to a traditional evolutionary game, and switching from phenotypes to haplotypes as the new game׳s pure strategies. Here, the relevant pure strategy׳s payoffs derived by summing the payoffs of all the phenotypes capable of producing gametes containing that particular haplotype weighted by the pertinent probabilities. The resulting game is structurally identical to the familiar Evolutionary Games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998. Cambridge University Press), and can be analyzed in terms of an established analytical framework for such games. And these results can be translated into the terms of genotypic, and whence, phenotypic evolutionary stability pertinent to the original game.
在本文中，我提出了一个适用于明确模拟有性繁殖二倍体种群进化过程的多态进化博弈分析框架。所提出方法的主要方面是将二倍体遗传学和有性重组加入到传统进化博弈中，并从表型转换为单倍型作为新博弈的纯策略。在此，通过对所有能够产生包含该特定单倍型配子的表型的收益进行加权求和，得出相关纯策略的收益。由此产生的博弈在结构上与具有非线性纯策略收益的常见进化博弈（霍夫鲍尔和西格蒙德，1998年。剑桥大学出版社）相同，并且可以根据此类博弈已有的分析框架进行分析。这些结果可以转化为与原始博弈相关的基因型以及表型进化稳定性的术语。
