Ruppin Academic Center, School of Engineering, Unit of Engineering & Management, Emek Hefer 40250, Israel.
J Theor Biol. 2019 Feb 7;462:475-478. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.12.004. Epub 2018 Dec 4.
The classical, monomorphic, evolutionary games analyze competition among phenotypes while implicitly assuming monomorphic transmission of phenotypic attributes to successive generations. The recently formulated polymorphic evolutionary game theory (PEGT), which adds the underlying genetics and sexual reproduction to evolutionary games, has the potential to revolutionize game theoretical modeling of co-evolutionary processes. In this paper, I apply PEGT methods to the analysis of animal conflicts - the oldest, and one of the best-developed areas of evolutionary game modeling. Overall, the polymorphic results are consistent with the sequential assessment hypothesis. However, beyond the specific, the results indicate the need for a degree of caution applied to the existing evolutionary stability results - as the polymorphic analysis shows that monomorphic ESS can be destabilized by sexual recombination. Finally, due to the novelty of the analytical approach, I make a particular emphasis on methodology: in particular, demonstrating how to combine generation of pertinent phenotypes with genetic plausibility considerations in the design of PEGT models.
经典的、单态的、进化博弈分析了表型之间的竞争，同时隐含地假设表型属性以单态的方式传递给后代。最近提出的多态进化博弈论（PEGT），将潜在遗传学和有性繁殖加入到进化博弈中，有可能彻底改变协同进化过程的博弈理论建模。在本文中，我将 PEGT 方法应用于动物冲突的分析——这是进化博弈建模最古老、最发达的领域之一。总的来说，多态的结果与顺序评估假设一致。然而，除了具体的情况，结果表明需要对现有的进化稳定性结果保持一定的谨慎——因为多态分析表明，有性重组可能会使单态的 ESS 失去稳定性。最后，由于分析方法的新颖性，我特别强调方法学：特别是，演示如何在 PEGT 模型的设计中，将相关表型的生成与遗传可行性考虑结合起来。
