Iacona Gwenllian D, Bode Michael, Armsworth Paul R
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Knoxville, TN, 37996-1610, U.S.A..
The University of Melbourne, School of Botany, Parkville, VIC, 3010, Australia.
Conserv Biol. 2016 Dec;30(6):1245-1254. doi: 10.1111/cobi.12739. Epub 2016 Aug 10.
To counteract global species decline, modern biodiversity conservation engages in large projects, spends billions of dollars, and includes many organizations working simultaneously within regions. To add to this complexity, the conservation sector has hierarchical structure, where conservation actions are often outsourced by funders (foundations, government, etc.) to local organizations that work on-the-ground. In contrast, conservation science usually assumes that a single organization makes resource allocation decisions. This discrepancy calls for theory to understand how the expected biodiversity outcomes change when interactions between organizations are accounted for. Here, we used a game theoretic model to explore how biodiversity outcomes are affected by vertical and horizontal interactions between 3 conservation organizations: a funder that outsourced its actions and 2 local conservation organizations that work on-the-ground. Interactions between the organizations changed the spending decisions made by individual organizations, and thereby the magnitude and direction of the conservation benefits. We showed that funders would struggle to incentivize recipient organizations with set priorities to perform desired actions, even when they control substantial amounts of the funding and employ common contracting approaches to enhance outcomes. Instead, biodiversity outcomes depended on priority alignment across the organizations. Conservation outcomes for the funder were improved by strategic interactions when organizational priorities were well aligned, but decreased when priorities were misaligned. Meanwhile, local organizations had improved outcomes regardless of alignment due to additional funding in the system. Given that conservation often involves the aggregate actions of multiple organizations with different objectives, strategic interactions between organizations need to be considered if we are to predict possible outcomes of conservation programs or costs of achieving conservation targets.
为了应对全球物种减少的问题，现代生物多样性保护开展了大型项目，投入了数十亿美元，并有许多组织在各地区同时开展工作。更复杂的是，保护部门具有层级结构，保护行动通常由资助者（基金会、政府等）外包给实地开展工作的当地组织。相比之下，保护科学通常假定由单个组织做出资源分配决策。这种差异需要理论来理解当考虑组织间的相互作用时，预期的生物多样性结果会如何变化。在此，我们使用博弈论模型来探究生物多样性结果如何受到三个保护组织之间垂直和水平相互作用的影响：一个将行动外包的资助者以及两个实地开展工作的当地保护组织。组织间的相互作用改变了单个组织的支出决策，进而改变了保护效益的大小和方向。我们发现，资助者即便控制着大量资金并采用常见的合同方式来提升成果，也难以激励接受资助的组织按照既定优先事项去开展期望的行动。相反，生物多样性结果取决于各组织间优先事项的一致性。当组织优先事项高度一致时，战略互动会改善资助者的保护成果；而当优先事项不一致时，成果则会下降。与此同时，由于系统中有额外资金，当地组织无论优先事项是否一致，其成果都会得到改善。鉴于保护工作通常涉及多个目标各异的组织的总体行动，若要预测保护项目的可能结果或实现保护目标的成本，就需要考虑组织间的战略互动。
