Symons Xavier
J Med Ethics. 2017 Apr;43(4):245-247. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103702. Epub 2016 Sep 9.
Schuklenk and Smalling argue that it is practically impossible for civic institutions to meet the conditions necessary to ensure that conscientious objection does not conflict with the core principles of liberal democracies. In this response, I propose an alternative definition of conscience to that offered by Schuklenk and Smalling. I discuss what I call the 'traditional' notion of conscience, and contrast this with the existentialist conception of conscience (which I take to be a close cousin of the view targeted by Schuklenk and Smalling). I argue that the traditional notion, grounded in an objective moral order, avoids the criticisms advanced by Schuklenk and Smalling; the existentialist conception, in contrast, does not. I conclude by discussing the benefits and risks of a 'restricted view' of respect for conscience.
舒克莱恩克和斯莫林认为，公民机构几乎不可能满足必要条件，以确保出于良心拒服兵役不与自由民主国家的核心原则相冲突。在本回应中，我提出了一个与舒克莱恩克和斯莫林所提供的不同的良心定义。我讨论了我所谓的“传统”良心观念，并将其与存在主义的良心概念（我认为这与舒克莱恩克和斯莫林所针对的观点相近）进行对比。我认为，基于客观道德秩序的传统观念避免了舒克莱恩克和斯莫林所提出的批评；相比之下，存在主义概念则不然。最后，我讨论了对良心尊重的“受限观点”的益处和风险。
