Matsuzawa Ryo, Tanimoto Jun, Fukuda Eriko
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
Phys Rev E. 2016 Aug;94(2-1):022114. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.94.022114. Epub 2016 Aug 11.
The existence of a zealot who stays a cooperator irrespective of the result of an interaction has been reported to add "social viscosity" to a population and thereby helps increase the cooperation level in prisoner's dilemma games, which premises the so-called well-mixed situation of a population. We found that this is not always true when a spatial structure, i.e., connecting agent, is introduced. Deploying zealots is counterproductive, especially when the underlying topology is homogenous, similar to that of a lattice. Our simulation reveals how the existence of never-converting cooperators destroys rather than boosts cooperation. We explain detailed mechanisms behind this interesting finding by referring to our previously presented concepts with respect to evolutionary dynamic processes for spatial games under the names enduring and expanding periods.
据报道，存在这样一种狂热者，无论互动结果如何，他们都会保持合作，这会给群体增加“社会粘性”，从而有助于提高囚徒困境博弈中的合作水平，而囚徒困境博弈假定群体处于所谓的完全混合状态。我们发现，当引入空间结构（即连接主体）时，情况并非总是如此。部署狂热者会适得其反，尤其是当底层拓扑结构是均匀的，类似于晶格时。我们的模拟揭示了从不转变的合作者的存在是如何破坏而非促进合作的。我们通过参考之前提出的关于空间博弈进化动态过程的概念（即持久期和扩张期）来解释这一有趣发现背后的详细机制。
