Douglas Thomas
Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2017 Jan;26(1):143-158. doi: 10.1017/S0963180116000712.
This article examines one kind of conscientious refusal: the refusal of healthcare professionals to treat sexual dysfunction in individuals with a history of sexual offending. According to what I call the orthodoxy, such refusal is invariably impermissible, whereas at least one other kind of conscientious refusal-refusal to offer abortion services-is not. I seek to put pressure on the orthodoxy by (1) motivating the view that either both kinds of conscientious refusal are permissible or neither is, and (2) critiquing two attempts to buttress it.
医疗保健专业人员拒绝为有性犯罪史的个人治疗性功能障碍。按照我所谓的正统观点,这种拒绝总是不被允许的,而至少另一种出于良心的拒绝——拒绝提供堕胎服务——则不然。我试图通过以下方式对正统观点施加压力:其一,促使人们认为这两种出于良心的拒绝要么都被允许,要么都不被允许;其二,批判两种支持正统观点的尝试。