• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

解决公共物品博弈中的二阶搭便车问题:使用领导支持系统的实验。

Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system.

机构信息

Faculty of Law, Economics and Humanities, Kagoshima University, 1-21-30, Korimoto, Kagoshima 890-0065, Japan.

School of Psychology Practices, College of Integrated Human and Social Welfare Studies, Shukutoku University, 200, Daiganji-cho, Chuo-ku, Chiba 260-8701, Japan.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2016 Dec 9;6:38349. doi: 10.1038/srep38349.

DOI:10.1038/srep38349
PMID:27934871
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5146942/
Abstract

Punishment of non-cooperators-free riders-can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a "leader support system," in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader's punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders-who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.

摘要

对不合作者(搭便车者)的惩罚可以导致公共物品博弈(PGG)中的高合作率。然而,不支付惩罚成本的二阶搭便车者会降低惩罚的效果。在这里,我们引入了一种“领导支持系统”,其中一个组长可以自由地惩罚使用组内追随者支持筹集的资金的组内追随者。在我们的实验中,参与者反复进行三个阶段:追随者为他们的团队决定合作的 PGG 阶段;追随者决定是否支持组长的支持阶段;以及组长可以惩罚任何追随者的惩罚阶段。我们将有支持的条件与没有支持的条件进行比较,在后者中,组长的惩罚有外部来源。结果表明,在有支持的条件下,惩罚比没有支持的条件更频繁地发生。在前者中,在链接型领导者(既惩罚不合作者又惩罚不支持者)的领导下,合作率更高,对领导者的支持也更高。此外,链接型领导者自身获得的收益高于其他领导者类型,因为他们获得了更多的支持。这意味着,能够有效惩罚追随者的领导者可以增加自己的利益,从而解决二阶搭便车问题。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c8b8/5146942/6c4eaea2d0bc/srep38349-f2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c8b8/5146942/746d4e1d4f3b/srep38349-f1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c8b8/5146942/6c4eaea2d0bc/srep38349-f2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c8b8/5146942/746d4e1d4f3b/srep38349-f1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/c8b8/5146942/6c4eaea2d0bc/srep38349-f2.jpg

相似文献

1
Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system.解决公共物品博弈中的二阶搭便车问题:使用领导支持系统的实验。
Sci Rep. 2016 Dec 9;6:38349. doi: 10.1038/srep38349.
2
The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery.存在仁慈领导者与贿赂行为的公共物品困境中的新加坡模式。
J Theor Biol. 2020 Sep 21;501:110345. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110345. Epub 2020 May 22.
3
Group leaders establish cooperative norms that persist in subsequent interactions.组长建立了在后续互动中持续存在的合作规范。
PLoS One. 2019 Sep 19;14(9):e0222724. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0222724. eCollection 2019.
4
The evolution of leader-follower reciprocity: the theory of service-for-prestige.领导者-追随者互惠关系的演变:服务-威望理论。
Front Hum Neurosci. 2014 Jun 4;8:363. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00363. eCollection 2014.
5
Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game.公共物品博弈中合作者与惩罚者的稳定多态性
J Theor Biol. 2017 Apr 21;419:243-253. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.11.012. Epub 2016 Nov 21.
6
Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible.当反社会惩罚成为可能时,在探索动态中,惩罚并不能促进合作。
J Theor Biol. 2014 Nov 7;360:163-171. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.041. Epub 2014 Jul 8.
7
Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation.在惩罚一阶搭便车者之前先惩罚二阶搭便车者:群体惩罚优先级对合作的影响。
Sci Rep. 2017 Oct 30;7(1):14379. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-13918-8.
8
Punishment in the public goods game is evaluated negatively irrespective of non-cooperators' motivation.在公共物品博弈中,惩罚无论非合作者的动机如何都会被负面评价。
Front Psychol. 2023 Jun 29;14:1198797. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1198797. eCollection 2023.
9
Bonus-based mercenary punishment promotes cooperation in public goods games.基于奖励的雇佣兵惩罚促进公共物品博弈中的合作。
Heliyon. 2023 Nov 29;10(1):e22748. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e22748. eCollection 2024 Jan 15.
10
Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment.民主决策建立了稳定的权威,克服了二阶惩罚的悖论。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2014 Jan 14;111(2):752-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1315273111. Epub 2013 Dec 23.

引用本文的文献

1
The Limits of Our Explanation: A Case Study in Cooperation.我们解释的局限性:一个合作案例研究
Biol Theory. 2025;20(1):25-40. doi: 10.1007/s13752-024-00479-z. Epub 2024 Nov 12.
2
Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game.自利惩罚在空间公共物品博弈中胜过利他惩罚。
Sci Rep. 2021 Mar 22;11(1):6584. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-85814-1.
3
The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society.本地化社会中同伴奖惩对公共物品问题的作用。

本文引用的文献

1
Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans.构建利维坦——惩罚权力的自愿集中维持人类的合作。
Sci Rep. 2016 Feb 18;6:20767. doi: 10.1038/srep20767.
2
The reputation of punishers.惩罚者的声誉。
Trends Ecol Evol. 2015 Feb;30(2):98-103. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003. Epub 2015 Jan 7.
3
An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons.一项经济实验表明,人类更倾向于采用集体惩罚来维护公共资源。
Sci Rep. 2020 May 19;10(1):8211. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-64930-4.
4
Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.异步排除对随机演化可选公共物品博弈中合作进化的好处。
Sci Rep. 2019 Jun 3;9(1):8208. doi: 10.1038/s41598-019-44725-y.
5
Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation.在惩罚一阶搭便车者之前先惩罚二阶搭便车者:群体惩罚优先级对合作的影响。
Sci Rep. 2017 Oct 30;7(1):14379. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-13918-8.
Proc Biol Sci. 2012 Sep 22;279(1743):3716-21. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2012.0937. Epub 2012 Jul 4.
4
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders.可持续的制度化惩罚需要消除二阶搭便车者。
Sci Rep. 2012;2:344. doi: 10.1038/srep00344. Epub 2012 Mar 30.
5
Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.互惠性:强还是弱?惩罚实验(能和不能)证明什么。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):1-15. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000069.
6
Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans.集中制裁和合法权威促进了人类的合作。
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jul 5;108(27):11023-7. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1105456108. Epub 2011 Jun 20.
7
The evolution of punishment through reputation.通过声誉来实现惩罚的演变。
Proc Biol Sci. 2011 Feb 7;278(1704):371-7. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2010.1275. Epub 2010 Aug 18.
8
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons.社会学习促进了对公共资源进行管理的制度的形成。
Nature. 2010 Aug 12;466(7308):861-3. doi: 10.1038/nature09203. Epub 2010 Jul 14.
9
Positive interactions promote public cooperation.积极互动促进公众合作。
Science. 2009 Sep 4;325(5945):1272-5. doi: 10.1126/science.1177418.
10
Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation.抑制公共物品博弈中的搭便车行为:指定的单独惩罚者能够维持人类合作。
Proc Biol Sci. 2009 Jan 22;276(1655):323-9. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1082.