Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, WC1E 6BT, UK.
Institut de Biologie, Eco-Ethologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland.
Trends Ecol Evol. 2015 Feb;30(2):98-103. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003. Epub 2015 Jan 7.
Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an individual's cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. By contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be inferred directly, then individuals with a nonpunishing cooperative reputation should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators.
惩罚是稳定自利主体之间合作的一种潜在机制。关于惩罚声誉重要性的理论和实证研究得出了相互矛盾的结果。在这里，我们提出，各种因素相互作用，解释了为什么惩罚声誉有时有益，有时有害。我们预测，在强制游戏场景和只有通过惩罚才能传达个人合作意愿和遵守公平规范意愿的情况下，最有可能产生收益。相比之下，如果可以进行伙伴选择并且可以直接推断出一个人的合作意愿，那么具有不惩罚合作声誉的个体通常应该比惩罚合作者更受欢迎。
