Liberman Alida
Bioethics. 2017 Sep;31(7):495-504. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12351. Epub 2017 Apr 3.
In this article, I address what kinds of claims are of the right kind to ground conscientious refusals. Specifically, I investigate what conceptions of moral responsibility and moral wrongness can be permissibly presumed by conscientious objectors. I argue that we must permit HCPs to come to their own subjective conclusions about what they take to be morally wrong and what they take themselves to be morally responsible for. However, these subjective assessments of wrongness and responsibility must be constrained in several important ways: they cannot involve empirical falsehoods, objectionably discriminatory attitudes, or unreasonable normative beliefs. I argue that the sources of these constraints are the basic epistemic, relational, and normative competencies needed to function as a minimally decent health-care professional. Finally, I consider practical implications for my framework, and argue that it shows us that the objection raised by the plaintiffs in Zubik v. Burwell is of the wrong sort.
在本文中，我探讨了何种类型的主张才属于能够为出于良心拒服兵役提供正当理由的恰当类型。具体而言，我研究了出于良心拒服兵役者可以被允许假定的道德责任和道德错误的概念。我认为，我们必须允许医疗保健专业人员就他们认为在道德上是错误的事情以及他们认为自己在道德上应负责的事情得出自己的主观结论。然而，这些关于错误和责任的主观评估必须在几个重要方面受到限制：它们不能涉及经验性错误、令人反感的歧视性态度或不合理的规范性信念。我认为，这些限制的来源是作为一名最起码体面的医疗保健专业人员所需的基本认知、关系和规范性能力。最后，我考虑了我的框架的实际影响，并认为它向我们表明，在“祖比克诉伯韦尔案”中原告提出的反对意见属于错误类型。
