Tanaka Shogo
Tokai University.
Theory Psychol. 2015 Aug;25(4):455-472. doi: 10.1177/0959354315583035. Epub 2015 May 6.
The main aim of this article is to revisit Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality (intercorporéité) and elaborate it as a new theory of social cognition. As is well known, theory of mind has been the central issue in the field of social cognition for more than two decades. In reviewing the basic concepts involved in two major theories (theory theory and simulation theory), I make clear that both theories have been missing the embodied dimension because of their mind-body dualistic supposition. The notion of intercorporeality, in accordance with the recent interaction theory, stresses the role of embodied interactions between the self and the other in the process of social understanding. I develop this notion into two directions and describe the related process of social cognition: one is behavior matching and primordial empathy, the other is interactional synchrony and the sense of mutual understanding. Through these embodied interactions, intersubjective meanings are created and directly shared between the self and the other, without being mediated by mental representations.
本文的主要目的是重新审视梅洛-庞蒂的交互主体性（intercorporéité）概念，并将其阐述为一种新的社会认知理论。众所周知，心智理论在二十多年来一直是社会认知领域的核心问题。在回顾两种主要理论（理论论和模拟论）所涉及的基本概念时，我明确指出，由于它们心身二元论的假设，这两种理论都忽略了具身维度。根据最近的交互作用理论，交互主体性概念强调自我与他人之间具身交互在社会理解过程中的作用。我将这一概念朝着两个方向展开，并描述社会认知的相关过程：一个是行为匹配和原初共情，另一个是交互同步和相互理解感。通过这些具身交互，主体间意义得以创造，并在自我与他人之间直接共享，而无需心理表征的中介。
