"Cumulative weighing of time in intertemporal tradeoffs": Correction to Scholten, Read, and Sanborn (2016).

Reports an error in "Cumulative weighing of time in intertemporal tradeoffs" by Marc Scholten, Daniel Read and Adam Sanborn (, 2016[Sep], Vol 145[9], 1177-1205). In the article, there was an error in Table 1. The preference for faster accumulation read {1,000, 0, 1,000} > {0, 500, 0}. It should read {0, 1,000, 0} > {500, 0, 500}. In addition, in the section , all the equations with the inequality ">" should read "≥" instead. The impact of this change is that, when considering the best model for each participant, as measured by Bayes Factors, the absolute goodness of fit, as measured by Bayesian -values, were better than reported in both Table A2 and the text. All of the corrected cells in Table A2 are 0%, meaning that none of the participants across Experiments 2-4 had a significantly ( <.05) poor fit by the model that described them best. None of the conclusions drawn in the text are altered by this change. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2016-41092-003.) We examine preferences for sequences of delayed monetary gains. In the experimental literature, two prominent models have been advanced as psychological descriptions of preferences for sequences. In one model, the instantaneous utilities of the outcomes in a sequence are discounted as a function of their delays, and assembled into a discounted utility of the sequence. In the other model, the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is considered along with utility or disutility from improvement in outcome utilities and utility or disutility from the spreading of outcome utilities. Drawing on three threads of evidence concerning preferences for sequences of monetary gains, we propose that the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is traded off against the of utility accumulation. In our first experiment, aggregate choice behavior provides qualitative support for the tradeoff model. In three subsequent experiments, one of which incentivized, disaggregate choice behavior provides quantitative support for the tradeoff model in Bayesian model contests. One thread of evidence motivating the tradeoff model is that, when, in the choice between two single dated outcomes, it is conveyed that receiving less sooner means receiving nothing later, preference for receiving more later increases, but when it is conveyed that receiving more later means receiving nothing sooner, preference is left unchanged. Our results show that this is indeed driven by those supporting the tradeoff model. The tradeoff model also accommodates all remaining evidence on preferences for sequences of monetary gains. (PsycINFO Database Record