Claidière Nicolas, Trouche Emmanuel, Mercier Hugo
Laboratoire de Psychologie Cognitive, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (UMR7290).
Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (UMR5304).
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2017 Jul;146(7):1052-1066. doi: 10.1037/xge0000323. Epub 2017 May 11.
Research in cultural evolution has focused on the spread of intuitive or minimally counterintuitive beliefs. However, some very counterintuitive beliefs can also spread successfully, at least in some communities-scientific theories being the most prominent example. We suggest that argumentation could be an important factor in the spread of some very counterintuitive beliefs. A first experiment demonstrates that argumentation enables the spread of the counterintuitive answer to a reasoning problem in large discussion groups, whereas this spread is limited or absent when participants can show their answers to each other but cannot discuss. A series of experiments using the technique of repeated transmission show that, in the case of the counterintuitive belief studied: (a) arguments can help spread this belief without loss; (b) conformist bias does not help spread this belief; and (c) authority or prestige bias play a minimal role in helping spread this belief. Thus, argumentation seems to be necessary and sufficient for the spread of some counterintuitive beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record
文化进化研究聚焦于直观或极少违背直觉的观念的传播。然而，一些非常违背直觉的观念也能成功传播，至少在某些群体中是这样——科学理论就是最突出的例子。我们认为，论证可能是某些非常违背直觉的观念得以传播的一个重要因素。首个实验表明，在大型讨论组中，论证能使一个推理问题的违背直觉的答案得以传播，而当参与者能互相展示答案但不能讨论时，这种传播就会受到限制或不存在。一系列运用重复传播技术的实验表明，就所研究的违背直觉的观念而言：（a）论证有助于无损地传播这种观念；（b）从众偏差无助于传播这种观念；（c）权威或威望偏差在帮助传播这种观念方面作用甚微。因此，论证似乎对于某些违背直觉的观念的传播是必要且充分的。（《心理学文摘数据库记录》 ）
