Brown Joel S, Vincent Thomas L
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721.
Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721.
Evolution. 1987 Jan;41(1):66-79. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.1987.tb05771.x.
Coevolution is modeled as a continuous game where the fitness-maximizing strategy of an individual is assumed to be a function of the strategy of other individuals who are also under selection to maximize fitness. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is sought such that no rare alternative strategies can invade the community. The approach can be used to model coevolution because the ESS may be composed of a coalition of more than one strategy. This work, by modeling frequency-dependent selection, extends the approach of Roughgarden (1976) which only considered density-dependent selection. In particular, we show that the coevolutionary model of Rummel and Roughgarden (1985) does contain frequency-dependent selection, and thus, their application of Roughgarden's criterion for evolutionary stability to a model for which it is not applicable leads to the erroneous conclusion that the ecological and evolutionary processes are in conflict. The utility of the game theoretic approach is illustrated by two examples. The first considers an ESS composed of a single strategy, the second an ESS composed of a coalition of two strategies. Evolution occurs on a frequency-dependent adaptive landscape. For this reason, the approach is appropriate for modeling competitive speciation (Rosenzweig, 1978). Also, the game theoretic approach is designed to combine the interplay between the background environment (including the biotic components) and the evolutionary potential of the populations or organisms. The actual application of this theory will require knowledge of both.
协同进化被建模为一种连续博弈，其中假设个体的适应度最大化策略是其他也在进行适应度最大化选择的个体策略的函数。我们寻求一种进化稳定策略（ESS），使得没有罕见的替代策略能够侵入该群落。这种方法可用于对协同进化进行建模，因为ESS可能由不止一种策略的联盟组成。这项工作通过对频率依赖选择进行建模，扩展了Roughgarden（1976）仅考虑密度依赖选择的方法。特别是，我们表明Rummel和Roughgarden（1985）的协同进化模型确实包含频率依赖选择，因此，他们将Roughgarden的进化稳定性标准应用于一个不适用该标准的模型，导致了生态和进化过程存在冲突的错误结论。博弈论方法的实用性通过两个例子来说明。第一个例子考虑由单一策略组成的ESS，第二个例子考虑由两种策略的联盟组成的ESS。进化发生在频率依赖的适应度景观上。因此，该方法适用于对竞争物种形成进行建模（Rosenzweig，1978）。此外，博弈论方法旨在结合背景环境（包括生物成分）与种群或生物体的进化潜力之间的相互作用。该理论的实际应用将需要两者的知识。
