Cressman R
Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, , Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5, Canada
Theor Popul Biol. 1996 Apr;49(2):189-210. doi: 10.1006/tpbi.1996.0011.
Evolutionary game theory is extended to models of two-species interactions where fitnesses are based on individual characteristics (strategies) rather than on a population dynamic that assumes homogeneous species. It is shown that the coevolutionary theories in the literature that combine ecology with genetic viability selection are part of this extended theory and that the dynamic stability resulting from a separation of ecological and evolutionary processes actually follows from game-theoretic solution concepts. The main focus of the paper is to investigate the application of the ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) solution concept to dynamic stability when fitnesses are given by random interactions between individuals as opposed to viability selection. For two-species frequency-dependent interactions, the ESS criterion that implies stability asserts that, in any system near the ESS, at least one of the species is better off (i.e., more fit) if it evolves towards the ESS. The global stability of a polymorphic two-species ESS that is shown for two-species matrix games gives a powerful tool to predict the course of evolution through static fitness comparisons.
进化博弈论被扩展到两物种相互作用的模型中，其中适应度基于个体特征（策略），而非基于假设物种同质化的种群动态。研究表明，文献中结合生态学与遗传生存力选择的协同进化理论是这一扩展理论的一部分，并且生态过程与进化过程分离所产生的动态稳定性实际上源于博弈论的解概念。本文的主要重点是研究当适应度由个体间的随机相互作用给出而非生存力选择时，ESS（进化稳定策略）解概念在动态稳定性中的应用。对于两物种频率依赖的相互作用，意味着稳定性的ESS准则断言，在任何接近ESS的系统中，如果至少一个物种朝着ESS进化，那么它的情况会更好（即更适应）。针对两物种矩阵博弈所展示的多态两物种ESS的全局稳定性，为通过静态适应度比较来预测进化过程提供了一个有力工具。
