Jing Yiming, Gries Peter H, Li Yang, Stivers Adam W, Mifune Nobuhiro, Kuhlman D M, Bai Liying
Institute for US-China Issues, University of Oklahoma, NormanOK, United States.
Brain Science Institute, Tamagawa UniversityMachida, Japan.
Front Psychol. 2017 Jun 2;8:864. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00864. eCollection 2017.
Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person "Preemptive Strike Game" (PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great powers. In Study 1, college students from the United States ( = 115), China ( = 106), and Japan ( = 99) made PSG decisions facing each other. This natural experiment revealed that Chinese and Japanese participants (a) made more preemptive attacks against each other and Americans than against their compatriots, and that (b) greater preexisting perceptions of bilateral competition increased intergroup attack rates. In Study 2, adult Americans ( = 127) watched real CNN expert interviews portraying United States-China economic interdependence as more positive or negative. This randomized experiment revealed that the more positive portrayal reduced preemptive American strikes against Chinese (but not Japanese), while the more negative portrayal amplified American anger about China's rise, increasing preemptive attacks against Chinese. We also found, however, that preemptive strikes were primarily defensive and not offensive. Interventions to reduce defensive aggression and promote great power peace are discussed.
为何怀有善意的大国最终会在它们并不寻求的战争中相互争斗？我们运用一个有激励机制的两人“先发制人打击博弈”（PSG）来探究大国相互依存的主观认知如何塑造针对敌对大国人员的防御性攻击。在研究1中，来自美国（ = 115）、中国（ = 106）和日本（ = 99）的大学生相互面对做出PSG决策。这个自然实验表明，中国和日本参与者（a）对彼此以及美国人发动的先发制人攻击比对本国同胞更多，并且（b）双边竞争的既有认知越强，群体间攻击率越高。在研究2中，成年美国人（ = 127）观看了真实的美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）专家访谈，这些访谈将美中经济相互依存描绘得更积极或更消极。这个随机实验表明，更积极的描绘减少了美国人对中国人（而非日本人）的先发制人打击，而更消极的描绘加剧了美国人对中国崛起的愤怒，增加了对中国人的先发制人攻击。然而，我们也发现先发制人打击主要是防御性的而非进攻性的。文中还讨论了减少防御性攻击及促进大国和平的干预措施。
