Shapiro Jesse M
Brown University and NBER.
J Public Econ. 2016 Dec;144:91-108. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.004. Epub 2016 Oct 27.
A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests' claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.
一名记者向一位选民报道一个未知的、与政策相关的状况。相互竞争的特殊利益集团可能会提出与事实相悖但在选民看来似乎可信的主张。避免偏袒的声誉激励促使记者向选民报道特殊利益集团的主张。在均衡状态下,即使记者掌握了全面信息,选民仍可能不知情。如果记者披露其党派倾向,沟通会得到改善。该模型对公众在气候变化问题上持续无知的现象给出了一种解释,这与叙述性和量化证据相符。