a Department of Psychology , Rice University , Houston , TX , USA.
Cogn Neuropsychol. 2017 Oct-Dec;34(7-8):403-411. doi: 10.1080/02643294.2017.1389707. Epub 2017 Oct 27.
More than thirty years ago, Alfonso Caramazza laid out assumptions for drawing inferences about the undamaged cognitive system from individuals with brain damage. Since then, these assumptions have been challenged including the transparency or subtractivity assumption, that the cognitive system does not reorganize following brain damage. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that brains are highly plastic. However, there is no clear connection between brain plasticity and cognitive reorganization. Brain plasticity research does not require a rethinking of the core logic of cognitive neuropsychology. Differences in task-based activation between damaged and undamaged brains provide little insight into the cognitive architectures of brain-damaged patients. Theory and methods are needed to understand cognitive neuroplasticity, or how neural reorganization that follows brain damage relates to reorganization of functions. We discuss alternative types of cognitive neuroplasticity that may occur in damaged brains and consider how they impact the basic logic of cognitive neuropsychology.
三十多年前，阿方索·卡马拉扎 (Alfonso Caramazza) 提出了一些假设，以便从脑损伤患者身上推断出未受损的认知系统。从那时起，这些假设就受到了挑战，包括认知系统不会在脑损伤后重新组织的透明性或可减性假设。已经反复证明大脑具有高度的可塑性。然而，大脑的可塑性和认知的重组之间没有明确的联系。大脑可塑性研究并不需要重新思考认知神经心理学的核心逻辑。在受损和未受损大脑之间基于任务的激活差异，对脑损伤患者的认知结构几乎没有洞察力。需要理论和方法来理解认知神经可塑性，或者理解脑损伤后神经重组与功能重组之间的关系。我们讨论了可能发生在受损大脑中的不同类型的认知神经可塑性，并考虑了它们如何影响认知神经心理学的基本逻辑。
