School of Criminology, Université de Montréal, Montreal, H3C 3J7, Canada; International Centre for Comparative Criminology (ICCC), Canada.
School of Criminology, Université de Montréal, Montreal, H3C 3J7, Canada; International Centre for Comparative Criminology (ICCC), Canada.
Int J Drug Policy. 2018 Apr;54:87-98. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.01.003. Epub 2018 Feb 8.
Since 2011, drug market participants have traded illegal drugs through cryptomarkets, a user-friendly infrastructure in which drug market participants can conduct business transactions. This study assesses market competition and the size and scope of drug vendors' activities on one of the largest cryptomarkets, AlphaBay, in order to better understand the challenges that drug vendors face when selling on this venue.
Relying on data collected from AlphaBay, we calculate the degree of competition within the drug market using the Herfindhal-Hirshmann Index (HHI). We then follow a micro analytical approach and assess the size and scope of vendors' accounts. This is done by evaluating each vendor's market share over time using a group-based trajectory model (GBTM). Results from the GBTM are then used to assess vendors' exposure, diversity and experience based on their selling position in the market.
The HHI scores demonstrate that cryptomarkets offer a highly competitive environment that fits in a top-heavy market structure. However, the distribution of vendors' market share trajectories shows that only a small portion of vendors (referred to as high-level vendors) succeed in generating regular sales, whereas the majority of vendors are relegated to being mere market spectators with almost zero sales. This inequality is exacerbated by the aggressive advertising of high-level vendors who post many listings. Overall, product diversity and experience is limited for all market participants regardless of their level of success. We interpret these results through Reuter's work on traditional illegal markets, e-commerce studies and the growing field of cryptomarket research.
We conclude that, while offering a new venue for illegal drug transactions, in many ways, the economics of cryptomarkets for drug dealing are consistent with Reuter's classic assessment of illegal markets and the consequences of product illegality that underlie it. Cryptomarkets conflicting features, a relatively open setting with relatively high barriers to entry and sales, shape the competitive, yet top-heavy market that emerges from our analysis. This creates a challenging environment for cryptomarket drug dealers.
自 2011 年以来，毒品市场参与者通过加密货币市场进行非法毒品交易，这是一个用户友好的基础设施，毒品市场参与者可以在其中进行商业交易。本研究评估了最大的加密货币市场之一 AlphaBay 上的市场竞争以及毒品供应商活动的规模和范围，以便更好地了解毒品供应商在该场所销售时所面临的挑战。
我们依赖于从 AlphaBay 收集的数据，使用赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数 (HHI) 计算毒品市场内的竞争程度。然后，我们采用微观分析方法评估供应商账户的规模和范围。这是通过使用基于群组的轨迹模型 (GBTM) 随时间评估每个供应商的市场份额来完成的。然后，使用 GBTM 的结果根据供应商在市场中的销售地位评估他们的暴露度、多样性和经验。
HHI 得分表明，加密货币市场提供了一个竞争激烈的环境，适合于头重脚轻的市场结构。然而，供应商市场份额轨迹的分布表明，只有一小部分供应商（称为高级供应商）成功地产生了定期销售，而大多数供应商则沦为几乎没有销售的市场旁观者。高级供应商的积极广告加剧了这种不平等，他们发布了许多列表。总的来说，无论其成功程度如何，所有市场参与者的产品多样性和经验都受到限制。我们通过 Reuter 关于传统非法市场、电子商务研究和加密货币市场研究领域的工作来解释这些结果。
我们的结论是，虽然为非法毒品交易提供了一个新的场所，但在许多方面，加密货币市场的毒品交易经济学与 Reuter 对非法市场的经典评估以及非法性产品背后的后果是一致的。加密货币市场的冲突特征，即相对开放的环境和相对较高的进入和销售壁垒，塑造了我们分析得出的竞争激烈但头重脚轻的市场。这为加密货币市场的毒品交易商创造了一个具有挑战性的环境。
