School of Management Science and Engineering, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang 050061, China.
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2018 Feb 21;15(2):367. doi: 10.3390/ijerph15020367.
Reducing carbon emissions, including emission abatement outsourcing at the supply-chain level, is becoming a significant but challenging problem in practice. Confronting this challenge, we therefore break down the practice to focus on a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer and one third-party emission-reducing contractor. The contractor offers a carbon reduction service to the manufacturer. In view of the increasing proportion of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions and absence of carbon reduction policies in developing countries, we adopt the prospect of consumers' low-carbon preferences to capture the demand sensitivity on carbon emission. By exploiting the Mean-Variance (MV) model, we develop a supply chain game model considering risk aversion. Comparing the supply chain performances of the cases under risk neutrality and risk aversion, we investigate the impact of the risk aversion of the supplier and the manufacturer on the low-carbon supply chain performances, respectively. We show that the risk aversion of chain members will not influence the relationship underlain by the profit-sharing contract between the manufacturer and contractor, whereas they may extend the supplier's concerning range. Although the manufacturer's risk aversion has a positive impact on the wholesale price, interestingly, the supplier's impact on the wholesale price is negative. Furthermore, we propose a contract to coordinate the risk-averse low-carbon supply chain by tuning the aversion levels of the supplier and the manufacturer, respectively. Through numerical study, we draw on managerial insights for industrial practitioners to adopt a low carbon strategy potentially by managing the risk attitudes along the supply chain channel.
减少碳排放，包括在供应链层面进行减排外包，在实践中正成为一个重大但具有挑战性的问题。面对这一挑战，我们因此将实践分解为重点关注由一个供应商、一个制造商和一个第三方减排承包商组成的低碳供应链。承包商向制造商提供碳减排服务。鉴于温室气体（GHG）排放量的比例不断增加，以及发展中国家缺乏碳减排政策，我们采用消费者低碳偏好的前景来捕捉对碳排放的需求敏感性。通过利用均值方差（MV）模型，我们开发了一个考虑风险厌恶的供应链博弈模型。通过比较风险中性和风险厌恶情况下供应链的绩效，我们分别研究了供应商和制造商的风险厌恶对低碳供应链绩效的影响。结果表明，链成员的风险厌恶不会影响制造商和承包商之间利润共享合同所隐含的关系，但可能会扩大供应商的关注范围。尽管制造商的风险厌恶对批发价格有积极影响，但有趣的是，供应商对批发价格的影响是负面的。此外，我们通过分别调整供应商和制造商的厌恶水平，提出了一种合同来协调风险厌恶型低碳供应链。通过数值研究，我们为工业从业者提供了管理见解，通过沿供应链渠道管理风险态度，潜在地采用低碳战略。
