Chitchumnong Piyayut, Horan Richard D
Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, 446 West Circle Drive, Room 303B, Justin S. Morrill Hall of Agriculture, East Lansing, MI, 48824-1039, USA.
Ecohealth. 2018 Jun;15(2):259-273. doi: 10.1007/s10393-018-1329-2. Epub 2018 Mar 16.
An individual's infectious disease risks, and hence the individual's incentives for risk mitigation, may be influenced by others' risk management choices. If so, then there will be strategic interactions among individuals, whereby each makes his or her own risk management decisions based, at least in part, on the expected decisions of others. Prior work has shown that multiple equilibria could arise in this setting, with one equilibrium being a coordination failure in which individuals make too few investments in protection. However, these results are largely based on simplified models involving a single management choice and fixed prices that may influence risk management incentives. Relaxing these assumptions, we find strategic interactions influence, and are influenced by, choices involving multiple management options and market price effects. In particular, we find these features can reduce or eliminate concerns about multiple equilibria and coordination failure. This has important policy implications relative to simpler models.
个人的传染病风险，以及因此个人减轻风险的动机，可能会受到他人风险管理选择的影响。如果是这样，那么个人之间就会存在战略互动，即每个人至少部分地基于他人的预期决策来做出自己的风险管理决策。先前的研究表明，在这种情况下可能会出现多重均衡，其中一种均衡是协调失败，即个人在保护方面的投资过少。然而，这些结果很大程度上基于涉及单一管理选择和可能影响风险管理动机的固定价格的简化模型。放宽这些假设后，我们发现战略互动会影响涉及多种管理选项和市场价格效应的选择，并受其影响。特别是，我们发现这些特征可以减少或消除对多重均衡和协调失败的担忧。这相对于更简单的模型具有重要的政策意义。
