Scott Rosamund, Wilkinson Stephen
Oxf J Leg Stud. 2017 Dec;37(4):886-915. doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqx012. Epub 2017 Aug 11.
In a legal 'first', the UK removed a prohibition against modifying embryos in human reproduction, to enable mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs), a move the Government distanced from 'germline genetic modification', which it aligned with modifying the nuclear genome. This paper (1) analyzes the uses and meanings of this term in UK/US legal and policy debates; and (2) evaluates related ethical concerns about identity. It shows that, with respect to identity, MRTs and nuclear genome editing techniques such as CRISPR/Cas-9 (now a policy topic), are not as different as has been supposed. While it does not follow that the two should be treated exactly alike, one of the central reasons offered for treating MRTs more permissively than nuclear genetic modification, and for not regarding MRTs as 'germline genetic modification', is thereby in doubt. Identity cannot, by itself, do the work thus far assigned to it, explicitly or otherwise, in law and policy.
在一项法律“首例”中,英国取消了对人类生殖中修改胚胎的禁令,以启用线粒体替代技术(MRTs),政府将此举与“生殖系基因改造”区分开来,认为它与修改核基因组类似。本文(1)分析了该术语在英美法律和政策辩论中的用途和含义;(2)评估了相关的身份伦理问题。结果表明,在身份方面,MRTs与诸如CRISPR/Cas-9之类的核基因组编辑技术(现已成为一个政策话题)并不像人们认为的那样不同。虽然不能由此得出两者应被完全同等对待的结论,但相较于核基因改造更宽容地对待MRTs以及不将MRTs视为“生殖系基因改造”的一个主要理由因此受到质疑。身份本身无法完成迄今为止在法律和政策中明确或隐含赋予它的任务。