Disorder of Selfhood in Schizophrenia: A Symptom or a Gestalt?

INTRODUCTION

The concept of schizophrenia (SCZ) was originally associated with a disorder of formal strata of the self. During the last two decades, empirical studies have demonstrated a selective hyper-aggregation of self-disorders in the SCZ spectrum. As with other scientific research areas, the role of self-disturbances in SCZ has been up for debate in various disciplines including cognitive sciences, philosophy of mind, and psychopathology. Several philosophical papers have used the psychopathological phenomena of "thought insertion" as an alleged example of a complete loss of minimal selfhood. In the field of psychopathology, it has been claimed that self-disorders may comprise a transdiagnostic phenotype. Common to these approaches is the underlying assumption that self-disorders reflect well-delineated and isolated symptoms akin to the notion of symptom in the medical model. The aim of this paper was to argue that the clinical manifestation of self-disturbances is to be seen as aspects of a Gestalt of disturbed experiential selfhood.

METHODS

Seven videotaped interviews of patients with SCZ who were emblematic of very diverse symptomatological constellations were selected and jointly watched and discussed by the authors, who reached a consensus assessment. The interviews were semi-structured and narrative in nature in order to obtain faithful self-descriptions according to the standards of phenomenologically oriented interviews. For the purpose of this article, we chose 4 videos from which excerpts were verbatim transcribed and translated from Danish into English.

RESULTS

The patients describe unique combinations of various psychopathological phenomena such as diminished sense of embodied self-presence, loss of ego boundaries, diminished sense of self, alienation and objectification of the experiential processes, mirror-phenomena, and Schneiderian passivity phenomena.

DISCUSSION

Through an interweaving of the four vignettes and their subsequent psychopathological discussions, we argue that the invariant commonality across the different symptomatic expressions in these patients resides in a Gestalt of pervasive disturbance of self-experience. From a phenomenological perspective, these self-disturbances target a basic structure of phenomenal consciousness, namely, the first-person givenness of experience. We conclude that self-disorders reflect a trait-instability in the most basic structures of consciousness in SCZ and that its clinical manifestations are to be seen as aspects of a particular Gestalt rather than appearing as separate and well-delineated symptoms.