医生概率判断中的双重结合谬误。

Double Conjunction Fallacies in Physicians' Probability Judgment.

机构信息

Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, Department of Philosophy and Education, University of Turin, Turin, Italy.

Department of Medicine, Local Health Service, Turin, Turin, Italy.

出版信息

Med Decis Making. 2018 Aug;38(6):756-760. doi: 10.1177/0272989X18786358. Epub 2018 Jul 6.

DOI:10.1177/0272989X18786358

PMID:29978726

Abstract

We report the first empirical data showing a significant amount of double conjunction fallacies in physicians' probability judgments concerning prognosis and diagnosis. Our results support the hypothesis that physicians' probability judgments are guided by assessments of evidential impact between diagnostic conditions and clinical signs. Moreover, we show that, contrary to some influential views, double conjunction fallacies represent an experimentally replicable reasoning bias. We discuss how the phenomenon eludes major current accounts of uncertain reasoning in medicine and beyond and how it relates to clinical practice.

摘要

我们报告了首个实证数据，表明医生在预后和诊断概率判断中存在大量的双重合取谬误。我们的结果支持了这样一种假设，即医生的概率判断是由对诊断条件和临床症状之间证据影响的评估来指导的。此外，我们还表明，与一些有影响力的观点相反，双重合取谬误代表了一种可在实验中复制的推理偏差。我们讨论了这一现象如何逃避了当前医学和其他领域中不确定推理的主要解释，以及它与临床实践的关系。