Center on Global Poverty and Development, Stanford University, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Proc Biol Sci. 2018 Sep 5;285(1886):20181508. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1508.
Reputational concerns are believed to play a crucial role in explaining cooperative behaviour among non-kin humans. Individuals cooperate to avoid a negative social image, if being branded as defector reduces pay-offs from future interactions. Similarly, individuals sanction defectors to gain a reputation as punisher, prompting future co-players to cooperate. But reputation can only effectively support cooperation if a sufficient number of individuals condition their strategies on their co-players' reputation, and if a sufficient number of group members are willing to record and transmit the relevant information about past actions. Using computer simulations, this paper argues that starting from a pool of non-cooperative individuals, a reputation system based on punishment is likely to emerge and to be the driver of the initial evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, once cooperation is established in a group, it will be sustained mainly through a reputation mechanism based on cooperative actions.
声誉问题被认为在解释非亲属人类之间的合作行为方面起着至关重要的作用。如果被贴上叛徒的标签会降低未来互动的回报，个体就会为了避免负面的社会形象而合作。同样地，个体也会制裁叛徒，以树立惩罚者的声誉，促使未来的共同参与者合作。但是，如果没有足够多的个体根据其共同参与者的声誉来调整策略，并且没有足够多的群体成员愿意记录和传递过去行为的相关信息，那么声誉只能有效地支持合作。本文通过计算机模拟证明，从一群非合作的个体开始，一个基于惩罚的声誉系统很可能会出现，并成为合作行为初始演化的驱动力。然而，一旦合作在一个群体中建立起来，它主要将通过基于合作行为的声誉机制来维持。
