MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2018 Sep 7;67(35):969-973. doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6735a2.
The emergency response to Zika virus disease required coordinated efforts and heightened collaboration among federal, state, local, and territorial public health jurisdictions. CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center on January 21, 2016, with seven task forces to support the national response. The State Coordination Task Force, which functions as a liaison between jurisdictions and federal operations during a response, coordinated the development of CDC Guidelines for Development of State and Local Risk-based Zika Action Plans, which included a Zika Preparedness Checklist (1). The checklist summarized recommendations covering topics from the seven task forces. In July 2016, CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) awarded $25 million in supplemental funding to 53 jurisdictions (41 states, eight territories, and four metropolitan areas) to support Zika preparedness and response activities. In December 2016, CDC awarded an additional $25 million to 21 of the 53 jurisdictions at the greatest risk for seeing Zika in their communities based on the presence of the mosquito responsible for spreading Zika, history of local transmission, or a high volume of travelers from Zika-affected areas. The additional $25 million was part of the $350 million in Zika supplemental funding provided to CDC by Congress in 2016* (2,3). Funded jurisdictions reported progress through the checklist at five quarterly points throughout the response. Data were analyzed to assess planning and response activities. Among the 53 jurisdictions, the percentage that reported having a Zika virus readiness, response, and recovery plan increased from 26% in June 2016 to 64% in July 2017. Overall, Zika planning and response activities increased among jurisdictions from June 2016 to July 2017. The recent Zika virus outbreak underscores the importance of strengthening state, local, and territorial health department capacity for rapid response to emerging threats.
寨卡病毒病的应急响应需要联邦、州、地方和地区公共卫生部门之间的协调努力和加强合作。CDC 于 2016 年 1 月 21 日启动了应急行动中心,成立了 7 个特别工作组来支持国家应对行动。国家协调特别工作组在应对疫情期间充当各辖区与联邦行动之间的联络人,协调制定了 CDC 制定州和地方基于风险的寨卡行动计划指南,其中包括寨卡准备清单(1)。该清单总结了涵盖七个特别工作组主题的建议。2016 年 7 月,CDC 公共卫生准备与应对办公室(OPHPR)向 53 个辖区(41 个州、8 个地区和 4 个大都市区)提供了 2500 万美元的补充资金,以支持寨卡病毒的准备和应对活动。2016 年 12 月,CDC 根据蚊子传播寨卡病毒的存在、当地传播史或来自寨卡疫区的旅行者数量较高等因素,向 53 个辖区中的 21 个风险最大的辖区额外提供了 2500 万美元。这些额外的 2500 万美元是 2016 年国会向 CDC 提供的 3.5 亿美元寨卡病毒补充资金的一部分(2,3)。受资助的辖区在整个应对过程中每季度报告五次通过清单的进度。对数据进行了分析,以评估规划和应对活动。在 53 个辖区中,报告已经制定寨卡病毒准备、应对和恢复计划的辖区比例从 2016 年 6 月的 26%增加到 2017 年 7 月的 64%。总体而言,从 2016 年 6 月到 2017 年 7 月,各辖区的寨卡病毒规划和应对活动有所增加。最近的寨卡病毒疫情突显了加强州、地方和地区卫生部门快速应对新出现威胁的能力的重要性。