School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511-2387.
Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2019 Mar 19;116(12):5285-5292. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1802881115. Epub 2018 Sep 21.
Environmental and natural resource (ENR) policies that focus on group outcomes are common but have received relatively less attention from economists than policies based on individual behavior. Existing research tends to focus on particular contexts, such as water or air quality, fisheries, or land use. This paper discusses unifying themes of group performance policies, along with their advantages and disadvantages. We discuss a range of specific policy instruments, including group-based taxes, subsidies, and fixed penalties. We show how, in principle, group-based policies can be designed to achieve efficient provision of group-level environmental performance; however, in some cases, group policies can lead to suboptimal outcomes. We discuss the incentives for collaboration that can arise when regulators impose group performance policies, and the role that it can play in promoting efficient outcomes. We argue that the success of group-based policies will depend both on how the policy is designed (i.e., the external rewards and penalties) and on how the group operates. This implies potential complementarities between "top-down" regulatory interventions based on group performance and "bottom-up" within-group incentives for self-governance. Our discussion suggests that group performance policies should play a more prominent role in the suite of policy instruments considered by scholars and policymakers concerned with ENR management.
环境和自然资源（ENR）政策侧重于群体结果是很常见的，但相对于基于个人行为的政策，经济学家对其关注相对较少。现有研究往往侧重于特定的背景，如水质或空气质量、渔业或土地利用。本文讨论了群体绩效政策的统一主题，以及它们的优点和缺点。我们讨论了一系列具体的政策手段，包括基于群体的税收、补贴和固定罚款。我们展示了如何在原则上设计基于群体的政策来实现有效的群体环境绩效；然而，在某些情况下，群体政策可能会导致次优结果。我们讨论了当监管机构实施群体绩效政策时可能出现的合作激励，以及它在促进有效结果方面的作用。我们认为，基于群体的政策的成功将取决于政策的设计方式（即外部奖励和惩罚）以及群体的运作方式。这意味着基于群体绩效的“自上而下”监管干预与群体内部的自我治理激励之间存在潜在的互补性。我们的讨论表明，群体绩效政策应该在学者和关注环境和自然资源管理的政策制定者所考虑的政策工具中发挥更重要的作用。
