Brazilian Institute of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Brazilian Institute of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Tob Control. 2020 Nov;29(Suppl 5):s310-s318. doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055265. Epub 2020 Aug 25.
The significant market share of illicit cigarettes in Brazil is well established in the literature, nonetheless lacking clarity in terms of its actual size. Paraguay has a paramount role in this discussion, acting both as a supplier of illegal tobacco products to Brazil and as buyer of inputs from Brazil. A proper analysis of the illicit cigarette market in Brazil necessarily involves a deeper discussion of the Paraguayan production chain and its interaction with the Brazilian market.
International data were used to establish the bilateral legal trade pattern of tobacco-related products between Paraguay and Brazil, including inputs and final outputs. Inspired by the technical requirements methodology, available unmanufactured tobacco within Brazil was obtained by adding-up domestic production with net imports. Its historical behaviour was compared with legal cigarette production patterns within Brazil. Supposing rational agents, these two links of the Brazilian cigarette production chain should behave similarly: for lower final usage, less domestically available supply. Any discrepancies would suggest something abnormal in the production chain.
Brazil is a relevant legal supplier of intermediate goods for the Paraguayan tobacco complex and has an irrelevant position as legal buyer of Paraguayan tobacco-related goods (either inputs or final goods). Paraguayan net imports of production inputs seem to be abnormally high for their legal needs. In Brazil, a clear discrepancy between domestically available unmanufactured tobacco (input) and tax-based cigarette production (output) emerged throughout the years and, even more striking, has been growing over the years.
Excessive cigarette production inputs in Paraguay suggest a potential oversupply of cigarettes in that country-likely diverted to illicit trade. Likewise, discrepancies in the Brazilian tobacco production chain are also evidence of illicit tobacco trading in Brazil-not necessarily of final products. A deeper analysis of the Brazil/Paraguay tobacco supply chain would be welcomed given the likely operation of these two countries as a single 'production/consumption hub' of both legal and illegal products (either inputs or final tobacco products). Public policies should foster controls not only on cigarettes but also on raw inputs for their production.
非法香烟在巴西占据相当大的市场份额，这在文献中已有充分的记载，但非法香烟的实际规模仍不明确。巴拉圭在这一讨论中扮演着至关重要的角色，它既是巴西非法烟草制品的供应国，也是巴西烟草制品输入国的购买国。因此，对巴西非法香烟市场的准确分析必然需要更深入地探讨巴拉圭的生产链及其与巴西市场的相互作用。
利用国际数据，建立了巴拉圭和巴西之间烟草相关产品的双边合法贸易模式，包括投入和最终产出。受技术要求方法的启发，通过国内生产与净进口相加，得出巴西国内未加工烟草的可用量。将其历史行为与巴西国内合法香烟的生产模式进行比较。假设这些行为主体是理性的，那么巴西香烟生产链的这两个环节应该具有相似的行为：最终用途越低，国内供应越少。任何差异都表明生产链中存在异常情况。
巴西是巴拉圭烟草综合体中间品的重要合法供应国，而作为巴拉圭烟草相关商品（无论是投入品还是最终商品）的合法买家，其地位并不重要。巴拉圭的生产投入净进口似乎远远超过其合法需求。在巴西，多年来，国内未加工烟草（投入）和基于税收的香烟生产（产出）之间出现了明显的差异，而且更为显著的是，这种差异多年来一直在扩大。
巴拉圭香烟生产投入过多表明该国香烟可能供应过剩，这些香烟很可能流入非法贸易。同样，巴西烟草生产链中的差异也表明巴西存在非法烟草交易，而不仅仅是最终产品。鉴于这两个国家可能作为合法和非法产品（无论是投入品还是最终烟草产品）的单一“生产/消费中心”运作，对巴西/巴拉圭烟草供应链进行更深入的分析将是受欢迎的。公共政策不仅应控制香烟，还应控制香烟生产的原材料投入。
