Department of Economics, Sciences Po, CNRS, 75007 Paris, France;
Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policies (LIEPP), Sciences Po, 75007 Paris, France.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2018 Dec 4;115(49):12425-12428. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1813502115. Epub 2018 Nov 19.
In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a laboratory experiment, that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: () Past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate, and () when fines for noncooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer toward others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first one, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies.
在社会收益与私人激励不匹配的情况下，通过罚款来执行可以成为维持合作的一种方式。在本文中，我们通过实验室实验表明，即使过去的罚款不再有效，它们也会对当前的行为产生影响。我们记录了两种机制：（1）过去的罚款直接影响个人未来的合作意愿；（2）当过去不合作的罚款到位时，个人会从合作伙伴那里体验到更高水平的合作，并且与间接互惠动机一致，一旦这些罚款被取消，他们会对他人更友好。第二种机制在经验上更为普遍，与第一种机制不同，它会引发过去执行的滚雪球效应。我们的结果可以为昂贵的执法政策的设计提供信息。
