Daker Maurício V
Departamento de Saúde Mental, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais-UFMG, Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
Front Psychiatry. 2018 Dec 11;9:681. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00681. eCollection 2018.
Many psychopathologists have approached symptom complexes without prejudging them as physical deficits or diseases, an approach suitable to connections with normal mind, to a broad dimensional and anthropological view of mental disorders. It contrasts with the prevailing orientation in psychiatry toward the medical model of delimited diseases. Discussions of this order centered on symptom complexes gained special prominence in psychiatry between the early 20th century through Alfred Hoche and World War II through Carl Schneider. Their works, in addition to the work of other authors of that period, are considered. The late Kraepelin conceded the possibility that affective and schizophrenic manifestations do not represent disease processes but rather represent areas of human personality. Seeing mind or persons is a paradigmatic different perspective than seeing diseases. Re-emerge in this comprehensive or integrationist context the notion of unitary psychosis and philosophical questions as the mind-body problem; as background there was a process metaphysics. The possibility of human experience in a phenomenological sense is considered, and a matrix of symptom or function complexes is related to it. Examples of past unitary models of mental disorders with their neurophysiologic explanations are given, as well as an analogy to current biological aspects of the endogenous in chronobiology. The question or hypothesis arises whether mental symptom complexes are manifestations of mind constituents or functions that make human experience and mind possible. The present work is a conceptual analysis that indicates a positive answer to this question. The expectation is to emphasize the perspectives of investigation in psychopathology and sciences of mind fostered by this view of symptom complexes.
许多精神病理学家在研究症状复合体时,并不预先将其判定为身体缺陷或疾病,这种方法适用于与正常心理的联系,适用于对精神障碍的广义维度和人类学视角。这与精神病学中盛行的朝向界定明确疾病的医学模式的取向形成对比。在20世纪初至阿尔弗雷德·霍赫时期以及第二次世界大战至卡尔·施奈德时期,围绕症状复合体的此类讨论在精神病学中尤为突出。除了那个时期其他作者的作品外,他们的作品也在考虑范围内。晚期的克雷佩林承认,情感和精神分裂症表现可能并不代表疾病过程,而更代表人类人格的领域。看待心理或人是一种与看待疾病截然不同的范式视角。在这种全面或整合主义的背景下,单一精神病的概念以及诸如身心问题等哲学问题再次出现;其背景是一种过程形而上学。考虑了现象学意义上人类体验的可能性,并将症状或功能复合体的矩阵与之相关联。给出了过去精神障碍单一模型及其神经生理学解释的例子,以及与生物钟学中内源性当前生物学方面的类比。问题或假设出现了,即精神症状复合体是否是使人类体验和心理成为可能的心理成分或功能的表现。本研究是一项概念分析,表明对这个问题的肯定回答。期望强调这种症状复合体观点所促进的精神病理学和心理科学研究视角。