Danish National Research Foundation, Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Schizophr Bull. 2013 Mar;39(2):270-7. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbs153. Epub 2012 Dec 23.
Questions concerning both the ontology and epistemology of the "psychiatric object" (symptoms and signs) should be at the forefront of current concerns of psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience. We argue that neglect of these issues is a crucial source of the stagnation of psychiatric research. In honor of the centenary of Karl Jaspers' book, General Psychopathology, we offer a critique of the contemporary "operationalist" epistemology, a critique that is consistent with Jaspers' views. Symptoms and signs cannot be properly understood or identified apart from an appreciation of the nature of consciousness or subjectivity, which in turn cannot be treated as a collection of thing-like, mutually independent objects, accessible to context-free, "atheoretical" definitions or unproblematic forms of measurement (as is often assumed in structured interviewing). Adequate and faithful distinctions in the phenomenal or experiential realm are therefore a fundamental prerequisite for classification, treatment, and research. This requires a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating (among other things) insights provided by psychology, phenomenological philosophy, and the philosophy of mind.
关于“精神科对象”（症状和体征）的本体论和认识论问题都应该成为临床神经科学的精神病学当前关注的首要问题。我们认为，忽视这些问题是精神科研究停滞不前的一个关键原因。为了纪念卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯（Karl Jaspers）的著作《普通精神病理学》出版一百周年，我们对当代的“操作主义”认识论提出了批评，这一批评与雅斯贝尔斯的观点是一致的。如果不了解意识或主观性的本质，就无法正确理解或识别症状和体征，而主观性又不能被视为一堆类似事物的、相互独立的对象，不能用与语境无关的、“无理论”的定义或无问题的测量形式来对待（这在结构化访谈中经常被假设）。因此，在现象或经验领域进行充分和忠实的区分是分类、治疗和研究的基本前提。这需要一种多学科的方法，包括（除其他外）心理学、现象学哲学和心灵哲学提供的见解。
