Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program,Philosophy Department,Washington University in St. Louis,St. Louis,MO
Behav Brain Sci. 2018 Jan;41:e65. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X17001935.
I respond to the Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentaries on my book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. I defend and amend both the skeptical challenge to morally responsible agency, that is, the book's impetus, and the anti-skeptical theory I develop to address that challenge. Regarding the skeptical challenge, I argue that it must be taken more seriously than some of my sanguine commentators assert, and consider some ways its impact might be blunted, such as by appeal to individual differences and the practical efficacy of human behavior. Regarding my positive theory, I defend the role of values in morally responsible agency against numerous criticisms, and consider various suggestions for elaborating my social, "collaborativist" account of morally responsible agency. In closing, I comment on the appropriate aspirations for theorizing about moral responsibility and agency.
我对针对我的书《与自己对话：反思、无知与能动性》的行为与脑科学评论作出回应。我为道德责任能动性所受到的怀疑论挑战，即本书的推动力，以及我为应对这一挑战而提出的反怀疑论理论进行辩护和修正。关于怀疑论挑战，我认为它必须比我的一些乐观评论者所断言的更为严肃对待，并考虑通过诉诸个体差异和人类行为的实际功效等方式来减弱其影响。关于我的积极理论，我为道德责任能动性中的价值观作用辩护，反驳了众多批评意见，并考虑了各种建议来阐述我关于道德责任能动性的社会的、“合作主义”观点。最后，我对关于道德责任和能动性的理论化的适当目标进行了评论。
