Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.
Health Serv Res. 2019 Oct;54(5):1137-1145. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.13170. Epub 2019 May 20.
To determine the effect of higher potential benchmark payment rates on the market for Medicare Advantage (MA) Dual-Eligible Special Needs Plans (D-SNPs).
DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Publicly available county-level data from 2009 to 2015 regarding the number of D-SNPs operating within the county, the enrollment in and five-star quality of score of these plans, and the benchmark amounts used to determine capitated plan payments.
This study exploits the introduction of quality bonus payments to the MA program in 2012, and exogenous geographic variation in the potential size of these bonuses to estimate the effect of benchmark payment increases on the availability, quality, and take-up of D-SNPs. We use a difference-in-difference estimation approach to compare changes in the market for D-SNPs in counties eligible for a double bonus to those that are not.
The doubling of bonuses was associated with a relative 29 percent increase in the number of D-SNPs offered (P = 0.021) and 0.1-star increase in the average quality of available D-SNPs (P = 0.034). No relative increase in overall D-SNP enrollment was detected.
These findings indicate that larger benchmark payment amounts may influence insurers' decisions of whether to participate in the D-SNP market but not dual-eligibles' decision of whether to enroll in these plans. Future research is needed to inform discussions about whether D-SNPs are a viable mechanism for integrating benefits for dual eligibles and the degree to which Medicare policies should support their continued growth.
确定更高的潜在基准支付率对医疗保险优势(MA)双重资格特殊需求计划(D-SNP)市场的影响。
数据来源/研究环境:2009 年至 2015 年,公共可用的县级数据,涉及在该县内运营的 D-SNP 数量、这些计划的参保人数和五星质量评分,以及用于确定人头付费计划支付的基准金额。
本研究利用 2012 年 MA 计划引入质量奖金支付,以及这些奖金的潜在规模的外生地理差异,来估计基准支付增加对 D-SNP 的供应、质量和参保率的影响。我们使用差异差异估计方法来比较有资格获得双重奖金的县和没有资格获得双重奖金的县的 D-SNP 市场变化。
奖金翻了一番,导致提供的 D-SNP 数量相对增加了 29%(P=0.021),可用 D-SNP 的平均质量提高了 0.1 星(P=0.034)。没有发现总体 D-SNP 参保人数的相对增加。
这些发现表明,更大的基准支付金额可能会影响保险公司是否参与 D-SNP 市场的决策,但不会影响双重资格参保人是否选择参加这些计划的决策。未来的研究需要为关于 D-SNP 是否是整合双重资格受益人的可行机制以及医疗保险政策应在多大程度上支持其持续增长的讨论提供信息。